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Abstract
We characterize monetary and fiscal policy rules to implement optimal re-
sponses to a substantial decline in the natural rate of interest, and compare
them with policy decisions made by the Japanese central bank and government
in 1999–2004. First, we find that the Bank of Japan’s policy commitment to
continuing monetary easing until some prespecified conditions are satisfied lacks
history dependence, a key feature of the optimal monetary policy rule. Second,
the term structure of the interest rate gap (the spread between the actual real
interest rate and its natural rate counterpart) was not downward sloping, indi-
cating that the Bank of Japan’s commitment failed to have sufficient influence
on the market’s expectations about the future course of monetary policy. Third,
we find that the primary surplus in 1999–2002 was higher than predicted by the
historical regularity, implying that the Japanese government deviated from the
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Ricardian rule toward fiscal tightening. These findings suggest that inappropri-
ate conduct of monetary and fiscal policy during this period delayed the timing
to escape from the liquidity trap.
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1 Introduction
Recent developments in the Japanese economy are characterized by the concurrence
of two rare phenomena: deflation and zero nominal interest rates. The year-on-year
CPI inflation rate has been below zero for about six years since the second quarter of
1998 (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the uncollateralized overnight call rate has
been practically zero since the Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy board made a decision on
February 12, 1999 to lower it to be “as low as possible” (see Figure 2).
(Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here)
The concurrence of these two phenomena has revived the interest of researchers
in what Keynes (1936) called a liquidity trap, and various studies have recently in-
vestigated this issue. These studies share the following two features. First, regarding
diagnosis, they argue that the natural rate of interest, which is defined as the equi-
librium real interest rate, is below zero in Japan, while the real overnight call rate is
above zero because of deflationary expectations, and that such an interest rate gap
leads to weak aggregate demand. This diagnosis was first made by Krugman (1998)
and shared by Woodford (1999), Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Jung et al. (2003),
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b) among others.1
Second, based on this diagnosis, these studies write out a prescription that the
BOJ should make a commitment to an expansionary monetary policy in the future.
Woodford (1999) and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) argue that, even when the
current overnight interest rate is close to zero, the long-term nominal interest rate
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could be well above zero if future overnight rates are expected to be above zero.2
In this situation, a central bank could lower the long-term nominal interest rate by
committing itself to an expansionary monetary policy in the future, thereby stimulating
current aggregate demand. As emphasized by Woodford (1999), Jung et al. (2003),
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b), an important feature of this prescription is
monetary policy inertia: a zero interest rate policy should be continued for a while,
even after the natural rate of interest returns to a positive level. By making such a
commitment, a central bank is able to achieve lower long-term nominal interest rates,
higher expected inflation, and a weaker domestic currency in the adverse periods when
the natural rate of interest significantly deviates from a normal level. This is as if a
central bank “borrows” future monetary easing in the periods when current monetary
easing is exhausted.
(Insert Table 1 here)
This idea of borrowing future easing has been discussed not only in the academic
arena, but also in the policy-making process.3 Just after the introduction of a “zero
interest rate policy” in February 1999, there was a perception in the money markets
that such an irregular policy would not be continued for long. Reflecting this percep-
tion, implied forward interest rates for longer than six months started to rise in early
March. This was clearly against the BOJ’s expectation that the zero overnight call
rate would spread to longer-term nominal interest rates. Forced to make the bank’s
policy intention clearer, Governor Masaru Hayami announced on April 13, 1999 that
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the monetary policy board would keep the overnight interest rate at zero until “defla-
tionary concerns are dispelled”.4 Some researchers and practitioners argue that this
announcement has had the effect of lowering longer-term interest rates by altering the
market’s expectations about the future path of the overnight call rate (Taylor (2000)).
Given such a similarity between the BOJ’s policy intention and the prescriptions pro-
posed by academic researchers, a natural question is whether or not the BOJ’s policy
commitment is close to the optimal one. The first objective of this paper is to measure
the distance between the optimal monetary policy rule derived in the literature and
the BOJ’s policy in practice.
The second objective of this paper is to think about the role of fiscal policy in a
liquidity trap. The typical textbook answer to the question of how to escape from
a liquidity trap is to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy, given that monetary policy
is ineffective in the sense of no more room for current interest rate reductions (Hicks
(1967)). Interestingly, however, researchers since Krugman (1998) pay almost no at-
tention to the role of fiscal policy. This difference comes from their assumption about
the behavior of the government: the government adjusts its primary surplus so that
the government intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied for any possible path of
the price level. That is, fiscal policy is assumed to be “passive” in the sense of Leeper
(1991) or “Ricardian” in the terminology of Woodford (1995). Given this assumption,
the government budget constraint is automatically satisfied, so that researchers need
not worry about the government’s solvency condition in characterizing the optimal
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monetary policy rule in a liquidity trap.5 However, this does not necessarily imply
that fiscal policy plays no role in the determination of equilibrium inflation. Rather, as
pointed out by Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003b),
a path for the primary surplus is uniquely selected when one chooses a monetary policy
path by solving a central bank’s loss minimization problem. Put differently, even if
a central bank faithfully follows the optimal monetary policy rule derived in the lit-
erature, the economy might fail to achieve the optimal outcome if the government’s
behavior deviates from the one compatible with the optimal monetary policy rule.
Then one might ask whether or not the assumption of passive fiscal policy was actu-
ally satisfied during the period in which the Japanese economy was in a liquidity trap.
Specifically, one might be interested in whether or not the Japanese government has
adjusted the primary balance as implicitly assumed in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes optimal policies
in a liquidity trap with a special emphasis on the optimal fiscal policy rule. Sections 3
and 4 compare the optimal commitment solution with the monetary and fiscal policy
adopted in 1999–2004. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Optimal commitment policy in a liquidity trap
2.1 A simple model
Household’s consumption decision Let us consider a representative household







where u(·) is an increasing and concave function with respect to ct+gt, and β represents
the discount factor. Following Woodford (2001), we assume that the private consump-
tion expenditures ct and the government purchases gt are perfectly substitutable, so
that government purchases have exactly the same effect on the economy as transfers
to households of funds sufficient to finance private consumption for exactly the same
amount. This assumption, together with the assumption of lump-sum taxes, creates
a simple environment in which the government behavior affects the equilibrium only
through changes in the household’s budget constraint. Also, we do not treat money bal-
ances and labor supply explicitly in the utility function in order to make the exposition
simpler (see Woodford (2003) for detailed discussions on these issues).







] ≤ Ptdt + Bht−1,t, (2.1)
where Pt is the price level, dt is the household’s disposable income, and Qt,t+j is a
(nominal) stochastic discount factor for pricing arbitrary financial claims that matures
in period t + j.6 We assume that the government issues zero-coupon nominal bonds,
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each of which pays one yen when it matures, and denote the face value of bonds
held by the representative household at the end of period t that will come due in
period t + j by Bht,t+j. Since the nominal market price in period t of a bond that
matures in period t + j is Et[Qt,t+j ] (=Et[1 × Qt,t+j]), the second term on the right-
hand side represents the amount of repayment for bonds that mature in period t. The
representative household allocates the sum of disposable income and the repayment
between consumption expenditures and the purchases of government bonds. The term
Bht,t+j − Bht−1,t+j represents the change from the previous period in the face value of
bonds that mature in period t + j, namely, an amount of net purchase in period t.
These new bonds are evaluated at the market price in period t. Note that nominal
bond prices must satisfy
Et[Qt,t+j ] = Et [Qt,t+1 Qt+1,t+2 × · · · × Qt+j−1,t+j ] ,
and that the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate in period t + k (k ≥ 0), which




Under the assumption that the central bank can control the one-period risk-free interest
rate, these two equations imply that the market’s expectations about the future course
of monetary policy, represented by the path of it+k, affects nominal bond prices.
The sequence of flow budget constraints and the No-Ponzi-game condition implies
an intertemporal budget constraint, and necessary and sufficient conditions for house-
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hold maximization are then that the first-order condition













holds at all times, and that the household exhausts its intertemporal budget constraint.
We assume that some part, denoted by νt, of the economy’s output yt is distributed
to another type of household that does not make consumption decisions based on in-
tertemporal utility maximization, so that the market-clearing condition can be written
as yt = ct + νt + gt. Substituting this condition into (2.2) yields













Substituting the same condition into the flow budget constraint (equation (2.1) with











where st represents the real primary surplus, which is defined as tax revenues less
government expenditures, and Bt,t+j is the supply of government bonds.
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We log-linearize equations (2.3) and (2.4) around the baseline path of each variable,




= θj ≤ 1 for j = 1, 2, · · · , (2.6)
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where θ is a parameter satisfying 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. We use ∗ to indicate the baseline path of
a variable. The term B∗t−1,t+j represents the face value of bonds at the end of period
t − 1 that mature in period t + j, and B∗t+j−1,t+j represents the face value of the same
type of bonds just before redemption in period t+ j. Equation (2.6) simply states that
the government issues additional bonds, which mature in period t + j, at a rate θ in
each period between t and t + j − 1. Note that θ = 0 corresponds to the case in which
all bonds mature in one period, while θ = 1 corresponds to the case in which all bonds
are perpetual bonds. With respect to other variables, we assume
c∗t = c
∗; y∗t = y
∗; s∗t = s
∗; P ∗t = P
∗; Q∗t,t+j = β
j; ν∗t = 0.
Note that the inflation rate is assumed to be zero on the baseline path.
Log-linearizing (2.3) around the baseline path, we obtain
x̂t = Etx̂t+1 − σ−1
[
(̂it − Etπ̂t+1) − r̂nt
]
, (2.7)
where a variable with a hat represents the proportional deviation of the variable from
its value on the baseline path (for example, ẑt is defined as ẑt ≡ ln zt− ln z∗t ),8 and σ is
a positive parameter defined as σ ≡ −u′′(y∗)y∗/u′(y∗). The output gap xt is defined as
xt ≡ yt − ynt , where ynt represents the natural rate of output or potential output. The
inflation rate πt is defined as πt ≡ ln Pt − ln Pt−1. Finally, the deviation of the natural
rate of interest from its baseline path, r̂nt , is defined as
r̂nt ≡ σEt
[
(ŷnt+1 − ŷnt ) − (ν̂t+1 − ν̂t)
]
. (2.8)
According to the above definition of r̂nt , variations in the natural rate of interest are
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caused by short-term factors such as changes in νt, as well as long-term factors such



















B̂t and Q̂t can be interpreted as a nominal debt aggregate, and an index of nominal
bond prices.
Equation (2.7) can be seen as an “IS equation” that states that the output gap in
period t is determined by the expected value of the output gap in period t + 1 and the
gap between the short-term real interest rate and the natural rate of interest in period






(̂it+j − π̂t+j+1) − r̂nt+j
]
. (2.10)




(̂it+j − π̂t+j+1) − r̂nt+j
]
stands for the deviation of the long-term real interest rate from the corresponding
natural rate of interest in period t, which implies that, given the path of the natural
rate of interest, the output gap depends inversely on the long-term real interest rate.
New Keynesian Phillips curve In addition to the IS equation, we need an “AS
equation” to describe the supply side of the economy. We adopt a framework of stag-
gered price setting developed by Calvo (1983). It is assumed that in each period a
11
fraction 1 − α of goods suppliers get to set a new price, while the remaining α must
continue to sell at their previously posted prices. The suppliers that get to set new
prices are chosen randomly each period, with each having an equal probability of being
chosen. Under these assumptions, we obtain an AS equation of the form10
π̂t = κx̂t + βEtπ̂t+1, (2.11)
where κ is a positive parameter which is conversely related to the value of α. Equation
(2.11) is the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, which differs from the traditional
Phillips curve in that current inflation depends on the expected rate of future inflation,
Etπ̂t+1, rather than the expected rate of current inflation, Et−1π̂t.
Locally Ricardian fiscal policy We assume that the government determines the




[Et(Qt,t+j) − Et−1(Qt−1,t+j)]Bt−1,t+j , (2.12)
where the term Et(Qt,t+j) − Et−1(Qt−1,t+j) represents the realized nominal one-period
holding return, including interest payments and capital gains/losses, for a bond that
matures in period t + j. Equation (2.12) simply states that the government creates
a primary surplus by an amount just enough to cover these payments on existing
liabilities. In a deterministic environment, in which there is no uncertainty about
the sequence of bond prices, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies it−1 =










j=0 Qt−1,t+jBt−1,t+j represents the market value of the existing gov-
ernment liabilities at the end of period t−1, and the right hand side of equation (2.13)
represents the interest payments on existing liabilities. Equation (2.13) is equivalent
to a budget deficit (not primary deficit but conventional deficit) targeting rule, and in
that sense, is very close to the spirit of the fiscal requirement of the Maastricht treaty
or the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union. Also, the fiscal
policy rule of this form is used in empirical studies such as Bohn (1998), in order to
describe the actual government’s behavior.








holds each period. That is, the market value of the existing government liabilities does
not change in each period as long as the government determines the primary surplus























This equation states that the fiscal policy rule (2.12) guarantees the transversality con-
dition for any path of the price level. Thus the government’s transversality condition
does not affect the price level in equilibrium as long as the government follows the rule
13
(2.12). Fiscal policy rules with this feature are called “passive” by Leeper (1991), and
“locally Ricardian” by Woodford (1995).
Equations (2.7), (2.9), (2.11), and the log-linear version of (2.12)





consist of four key equations of our model.12 Given the natural rate of interest r̂nt as
an exogenous variable and the short-term nominal interest rate ît as a policy variable,
which is determined as we see in the next subsection, these four equations determine
the equilibrium paths of x̂, P̂ (or equivalently π̂), B̂, and ŝ.13 It should be emphasized
that fiscal variables (ŝt and B̂t) do not appear in the IS and AS equations ((2.7) and
(2.11)), so that, given the paths of ît and r̂
n
t , these two equations determine the paths
of x̂t and π̂t (or equivalently P̂t), independently of the fiscal variables. In this sense,
equations (2.7) and (2.11) constitute an independent block in the four equations system;
namely, they first determine the paths of x̂t and π̂t, and, given them, the other two
equations determine the paths of the two fiscal variables (ŝt and B̂t). This structure
of the model is fully utilized when we characterize the optimal monetary policy rule in
the next subsection.
2.2 Optimal monetary policy
Adverse shock to the economy Following Jung et al. (2003), we consider a
situation in which the economy is hit by a large-scale negative demand shock; the
central bank responds to it by lowering the short-term nominal interest rate to zero;
but aggregate demand is still insufficient to close the output gap. More specifically,
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we assume that a large negative shock to the natural rate of interest, denoted by εn0 ,
occurs in period 0, so that the natural rate of interest takes a large negative value in
period 0 and subsequent periods. The deviation of the natural rate of interest from
the baseline path is described by
r̂nt ≡ ln(1 + rnt ) − ln(1 + rn∗t ) = ρtεn0 for t = 0, · · · , (2.16)
where rn∗t is the baseline value of the natural rate of interest, which is assumed to be
equal to β−1(1 − β), and ρ is a parameter satisfying 0 ≤ ρ < 1.14
It is important to note that the natural rate of interest r̂nt appears only in the IS
equation ((2.7)), and that fluctuations in the natural rate of interest could be com-
pletely offset if the central bank equalizes the short-term nominal interest rate to the
natural rate of interest (̂it = r̂
n
t ). In the usual situation, therefore, aggregate demand
shocks can be completely offset by an appropriate monetary policy. However, this is
not true if the natural rate of interest falls below zero and the non-negativity constraint
of the short-term nominal interest rate, it ≥ 0, or its log-linear version
ît + β
−1(1 − β) ≥ 0 (2.17)
is binding.
Optimization under discretion The central bank chooses the path of the short-
term nominal interest rates, starting from period 0,
{














subject to (2.7), (2.9), (2.11), (2.15), and (2.17). Since equations (2.7) and (2.11)
consist of an independent block, and the fiscal variables (ŝt and B̂t) do not appear in
the loss function, the optimization problem can be solved in a step-by-step manner:
we first minimize the loss function subject to (2.7), (2.11), and (2.17) and characterize
the optimal paths for ît, x̂t, and π̂t; then we substitute them into (2.9) and (2.15) to
obtain the optimal paths for ŝt and B̂t.
Under the assumption of discretionary monetary policy, the central bank reopti-







Lt + 2φ1t[x̂t − x̂t+1 + σ−1(̂it − π̂t+1 − r̂nt )] + 2φ2t[π̂t − κx̂t − βπ̂t+1]
}
,
where φ1t and φ2t represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS and AS
equations. We differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to π̂t, x̂t, and ît to obtain the
first-order conditions
π̂t + φ2t = 0 (2.18)




φ1t = 0 (2.20)
ît + β
−1(1 − β) ≥ 0 (2.21)
φ1t ≥ 0 (2.22)
Equations (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22) are Kuhn–Tucker conditions regarding the non-
negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate. Observe that ∂L/∂ît = 2σ−1βtφ1t ∝
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φ1t. If the non-negativity constraint is not binding, ∂L/∂ît is equal to zero, so that φ1t
is also zero. On the other hand, if the constraint is binding, ∂L/∂ît is non-negative,
and so is φ1t.
Given the assumption that the natural rate of interest converges monotonically to
its baseline value (see (2.16)), it is straightforward to guess that the non-negativity
constraint is binding until some period, denoted by period T d, but is not binding







Substituting φ1t = 0 into this equation leads to λx̂t + κπ̂t = 0, which, together with




for t = T d + 1, · · · . Thus the central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate at
zero during the periods in which the natural rate of interest is below zero, but, once
the natural rate returns to a positive level, the central bank equalizes it with the level
of the natural rate of interest. In this sense, the timing to terminate a zero interest
rate policy is determined entirely by an exogenous factor, r̂nt .
Optimization under commitment We now proceed to the commitment solution:
the central bank makes a commitment about the current and future path of the short-
term nominal interest rate, considering the consequences of the commitment on the
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private sector’s expectations. The first-order conditions become
π̂t − (βσ)−1φ1t−1 + φ2t − φ2t−1 = 0 (2.24)




φ1t = 0 (2.26)
ît + β
−1(1 − β) ≥ 0 (2.27)
φ1t ≥ 0 (2.28)
which differ from those obtained earlier in that lagged Lagrange multipliers, φ1t−1 and
φ2t−1, appear in the first two equations. We eliminate φ2t from equations (2.24) and
(2.25) to obtain a second-order difference equation with respect to φ1t.





for t = 0, · · · , T c + 1,(2.29)
where T c is the final period of a zero interest rate policy, and initial conditions are

















and ξ1 and ξ2 are the two real solutions to the characteristic equation associated with
the difference equation (2.29), satisfying ξ1 > 1 and 0 < ξ2 < 1.
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Equation (2.29) has the following implications regarding the differences between
the discretionary and commitment solutions. First, as pointed out by Woodford (1999)
and Jung et al. (2003), a zero interest rate policy is continued longer in the case of
commitment. To see this, we observe from equations (2.10), (2.11), and (2.30) that
φ1t = B(L)
[




B(L) ≡ κσ−1A(L) [κ(1 − βL−1)−1(1 − L−1)−1 + κ−1λ(1 − L−1)−1(1 − L)] .
Note that the real interest rate will never be below the natural rate of interest ((̂it −
π̂t+1)−r̂nt ≥ 0) in the case of discretion. Thus, if a zero interest rate policy is terminated
in period T d, φ1t takes a positive value at t = T
d + 1, indicating that
0 ≤ T d ≤ T c < ∞.
The optimal commitment solution is characterized by monetary policy inertia, in the
sense that a zero interest rate policy is continued for a while even after the natural rate
of interest becomes positive. This is in sharp contrast with the case of discretion, in
which a zero interest rate policy is terminated as soon as the natural rate of interest
becomes positive.
Second, we compare fiscal adjustments between the discretionary and commitment





















In either discretionary or commitment solutions, the short-term nominal interest rate
is set at zero for some periods and then returns to a normal level, which means that
E0(Q̂0,t) takes positive values in period 0 and subsequent periods and then returns to
zero. Given that θ ∈ [0, 1], this implies that the second term on the right-hand side is
non-positive, therefore the (nominal) primary surplus must be on or below its baseline
path.15 Furthermore, the degree of fiscal expansion depends on the maturity structure
of government bonds; the shorter the maturity, the larger the fiscal expansion. When
the maturity of bonds is very long, reductions in the short-term nominal interest rate
in the current and future periods raise bond prices significantly, therefore fewer fiscal
adjustments are needed.16




βtE0[ŝct − ŝdt ] = −
{ ∞∑
t=0























where the first term on the right-hand side is negative since P̂ ct is greater than P̂
d
t in















This indicates that the commitment solution cannot be achieved by monetary policy
alone, and that a close coordination with fiscal policy is indispensable.17 A more
expansionary stance should be taken on the side of fiscal policy, as well as on the side
of monetary policy.
2.3 Numerical examples
(Insert Figure 3 here)
In this subsection we numerically compute the optimal path of various variables.18
Figure 3 shows the responses of eight variables to an adverse shock to the natural rate
of interest in the case of discretion. The paths for the short-term nominal and real
interest rates and the natural rate of interest represent the level of those variables (it,
it−πt+1, and rnt ), while those of other variables are shown by the deviations from their
baseline values. The natural rate of interest, which is shown at the bottom left, stays
below zero for the first four periods until period 3, and becomes positive in period 4,
then gradually goes back to a baseline level. In response to this shock, the short-term
nominal interest rate is set at zero for the first four periods, but becomes positive as
soon as the natural rate of interest turns positive in period 4. Given the shock to the
natural rate of interest and the monetary policy response to it, the short-term real
interest rate rises and the spread between it − πt+1 and rnt is widened, as shown in the
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bottom-left panel. Consequently, inflation and the output gap stay below the baseline
for the first four periods during which a zero interest rate policy is adopted, and return
to zero as soon as that policy is terminated.
The four panels on the right-hand side of Figure 3 show the fiscal aspects of the
model. The price level falls during the first four periods and continues to stay at a
level below the baseline, while the bond price rises in period 0 and subsequent periods
reflecting the market expectation of monetary easing in the current and future peri-
ods. This leads to a rise in the real value of the existing public debt, which puts the
government under pressure to increase the real primary surplus, while lower interest
payments due to the zero interest rate policy create room for the government to reduce
the real primary surplus. Combining these two conflicting effects, the real primary sur-
plus is below the baseline for the first eight periods until period 7, but slightly above
the baseline path thereafter.
(Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 here)
Figure 4 shows the responses of the same set of variables for the case of commitment.
An important difference from the discretionary solution is that a zero interest rate
policy is continued longer. Reflecting this, the cumulative sum of the deviation of the
short-term real interest rate from the natural rate of interest becomes significantly
smaller in comparison with the case of discretion, leading to a decline in the real long-
term interest rate. This alleviates deflationary pressures on the inflation rate and the
output gap. Turning to the fiscal aspects of the model, monetary policy inertia (i.e.,
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prolonging a zero interest rate policy) keeps the price level higher than the baseline
path, which is in sharp contrast with the case of discretion. As a result, the real
primary surplus stays below the baseline path even after the zero interest rate policy is
terminated. The differences between the commitment and discretionary solutions (the
commitment solution minus the discretionary solution) are shown in Figure 5.
(Insert Table 2 here)
Table 2 shows the amounts of fiscal adjustments needed to achieve the optimal




are negative in both solutions, indicating that fiscal expansion is needed to achieve
the optimal outcomes. Note that the amount of fiscal adjustments is larger in the
commitment solution in which a zero interest rate policy is continued longer. Also, note
that the amount of fiscal adjustment depends on the maturity structure of government
debt: the amount of fiscal adjustment is larger when the maturity is shorter. Turning
to the real adjustments (
∑∞
t=0 β
j ŝt), they are positive in the discretionary solution
while negative in the commitment solution. This reflects a difference between the two
solutions in terms of the path of the price level. In the case of the discretionary solution,
the price level is lower than on the baseline (Figure 3), so that a larger primary surplus
is needed to finance larger real redemption. On the other hand, the price level is higher
than on the baseline in the commitment solution (Figure 4), thus a smaller surplus is
sufficient to finance smaller real redemption. The difference between the two solutions
again depends on the maturity structure of government debt: the real amount of fiscal
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adjustment becomes larger when θ is smaller.19
3 Monetary policy in 1999–2004
3.1 Term structure of interest rate gaps
As emphasized by Woodford (1999), Jung et al. (2003), and Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003a, b), history dependence is one of the most important features of the commitment
solution. To see how history dependent monetary policy affects the output gap and
inflation, we rewrite the IS and AS equations ((2.7) and (2.11)) as
x̂t = −σ−1(1 − L−1)−1
[
(̂it − Etπ̂t+1) − r̂nt
]
;
π̂t = −σ−1κ(1 − βL−1)−1(1 − L−1)−1
[
(̂it − Etπ̂t+1) − r̂nt
]
.
An important thing to note is that these two variables are determined soley by the
current and future values of the interest rate gap (i.e., the spread between the actual
real interest rate and its natural rate couterpart, [̂it −Etπ̂t+1]− r̂nt ), and, in that sense,
the interest rate gap is the key variable through which monetary policy affects the
real side of the economy.20 Given this structure, the central bank’s commitment to
continuing a zero interest rate policy even after the natural rate of interest becomes
positive makes the private sector expect that the interest rate gap, (̂it−Etπ̂t+1)−r̂nt , will
shrink and become negative in the future periods, thereby weakening the deflationary
pressure on the current output gap and inflation.
More specifically, as shown in Figure 3, the short-term real interest rate is never
below the natural rate in the discretionary solution, thus the term structure of interest
24





(it+k − πt+k+1) − rnt+k
]
, (3.1)
monotonically increases with K. In contrast, as shown in Figure 4, the short-term real
interest rate stays below the natural rate in periods 3 to 6 in the case of the commitment
solution, and therefore the gap defined by (3.1) declines during these periods. This is a
direct reflection of monetary policy inertia, and a key feature to discriminate between
the two solutions. These observations suggest a simple way to test whether the BOJ’s
actual policy is close to the optimal one: we estimate the term structure of interest
rate gaps to see whether or not the gap declines with K towards the end of recession.
(Insert Figure 6 here)
We start by estimating the natural rate of interest using the methodology developed
by Laubach and Williams (2003).21 Equation (2.8) may be rewritten as
rnt = σg
p
t + zt, (3.2)
where the potential growth rate gpt is defined as g
p
t ≡ Et(ynt+1 − ynt ), and the other
stationary component zt is defined as zt ≡ −σEt(νt+1 − νt). Following Laubach and
Williams (2003), we assume that gpt is a random walk process, while zt follows an AR
process. Using these two assumptions (together with other assumptions adopted in
Laubach and Williams (2003)), we estimate the natural rate of interest for the period
from 1982:1Q to 2003:4Q, which is presented in the upper panel of Figure 6. Note that
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the natural rate of interest shown here represents the annualized overnight rate. Figure
6 shows that the natural rate of interest was seven percent in 1990, and then gradually
declined until it reached almost zero in 1995. Furthermore, it declined below zero
in 1998:1Q-1999:2Q, 2000:3Q-4Q, and 2001:2Q-2002:1Q, indicating that Krugman’s
(1998) prescription for the Japanese economy is not rejected by the data. The middle
and bottom panels of Figure 6 decompose fluctuations in the natural rate of interest into
the two components: the random walk component (σgpt ) and the stationary component
(zt). The middle panel shows that the potential growth rate was barely above zero in
the 1990s, but fell below zero for the three quarters starting from 2001:3Q. Negative
values for the natural rate of interest are due to very low potential growth rates, as
well as adverse temporary shocks that had occurred several times after the mid 1990s.
(Insert Figure 7 here)
Figure 7 compares the natural rate of interest with the overnight real interest rate,
it − Etπt+1. We use the uncollateralized overnight call rate for it, and the actual
inflation rate in period t as a proxy for the expected overnight inflation rate. Figure
7 shows that the real call rate is significantly lower than the natural rate of interest
in the latter half of the 1980s, which is consistent with the results from the existing
studies that the BOJ’s policy was too expansionary, thereby contributing to the asset
price inflation during this period. It also shows that the opposite (i.e., the real call rate
is higher than the corresponding natural rate) happened in the period from 1998 to
2002. The nominal call rate had already been lowered to the zero lower bound during
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this period, but deflationary expectations kept the real call rate above zero, thereby
creating positive overnight interest rate gaps in these years.
Given that the time-series estimates for the natural rate of interest are to hand,





t+k, as well as a time-series for the expected rate of inflation. We construct
the first by utilizing the fact that the natural rate of interest consists of a random walk
component and a stationary component.22 As for the expected rate of inflation, we
use the five-year forecasts published by a private research institute, the Japan Center
for Economic Research (JCER) in December of each year.23 By using these two time-
series, we can compare the natural rate of interest and the real interest rate for various
time horizons (namely, K in equation (3.1)).
(Insert Figure 8 here)
The results of these calculations are presented in Figure 8, which shows the term
structure of interest rate gaps at the end of each year starting from 1998.24 First,
the term structure at the end of 1998, just before the introduction of the zero interest
rate policy, was upward sloping although the one-year gap was very close to zero.
The upward-sloping curve mainly comes from the term structure of nominal interest
rates.25 These two findings suggest that market participants expected that the BOJ
would not adopt expansionary monetary policy sufficient to offset an expected decline
in the natural rate of interest. Second, the term structure curve at the end of 1999
shifted downward from its position in 1998, and the gaps became negative for the
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time-horizon up to two years. This suggests that the BOJ’s new regime introduced
in early 1999 had successfully affected the market’s expectations. More importantly,
however, we see no indication of a downward sloping curve, suggesting that the BOJ’s
commitment was not powerful enough to generate an expectation that the short-term
real interest rate would decline below the level of the natural rate counterpart. Third,
the term structure curve at the end of 2001 was also upward sloping: to make matters
worse, it shifted up substantially from its positions in the preceding years, indicating
that quantitative monetary easing combined with a renewed commitment in March
2001 was not strong enough to offset a pessimistic expectation about the future path
of the natural rate of interest.26
3.2 Inflation targeting to implement the commitment solution
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a) propose a version of price-level targeting to imple-
ment the optimal commitment solution characterized by Jung et al. (2003). However,
as mentioned by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a), price-level targeting is not the
only way to implement it, but a version of inflation targeting can also implement the
commitment solution. The BOJ’s commitment relates the timing to terminate a zero
interest rate policy (or quantitative easing policy) to the rate of inflation, so that it
should be closer to inflation targeting rather than price-level targeting. In this sub-
section, we characterize a version of inflation targeting that achieves the commitment
solution and compare it with the BOJ’s policy commitment.
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History dependent inflation targeting We start by defining an output-gap ad-
justed inflation measure π̃t as
π̃t ≡ π̂t + κ−1λ(x̂t − x̂t−1),
and then denote a target for this adjusted inflation by πTart . We also denote the target
shortfall by ∆πt (∆
π
t ≡ πTart − π̃t). Given these definitions, we substitute φ1t = κ∆πt
into equation (2.29) to obtain
πTart = [1 + β
−1 + κ(βσ)−1]∆πt−1 − β−1∆πt−2. (3.3)
Now let us consider the following targeting rule. The inflation target for period 0 is
set at zero (πTar0 = 0), and the targets for the subsequent periods are determined by
equation (3.3). The central bank chooses the level of the overnight interest rate in each
period, so that it can achieve the predetermined target level for the adjusted inflation
rate. If the central bank successfully shoots the target in each period starting from
period 0, then ∆πt is always zero, therefore the target in each period never deviates
from zero. However, if the natural rate of interest falls below zero, the central bank
cannot achieve the target even if it lowers the overnight interest rate to zero. Then, ∆πt
takes a positive value, and consequently the predetermined target for the next period
becomes higher than zero. Given that the natural rate of interest evolves over time
following equation (2.16), the central bank fails to achieve the targets in period 0 and
subsequent periods even though it lowers the overnight interest rate to zero. Therefore
the central bank must continue a zero interest rate policy until it achieves the target
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in some period, which is denoted by T + 1. Since ∆πT+1 equals to zero by definition,
φ1T+1 must equal to zero as well, therefore T = T
c must hold. Put differently, the
central bank is able to implement the commitment solution by adopting a version of
inflation targeting in which the target inflation rate is updated in each period following
(3.3).27 It is important to note that this inflation targeting has a feature of history
dependence since the current target inflation rate depends on the values of the natural
rate of interest and the performance of monetary policy in the past.
(Insert Figure 9 here)
The upper panel of Figure 9 shows the evolution of the target inflation rate that is
needed to implement the commitment solution presented in Figure 4. The values for
the adjusted inflation rate are below its target levels in the first six periods, but the
target shortfall in each period gradually decreases until it finally reaches zero in period
6, when the central bank terminates the zero interest rate policy.
A comparison with the BOJ rule The regime of history dependent inflation
targeting defined above has some similarities with the BOJ’s commitment of continuing
a zero interest rate policy (or quantitative easing policy) until some conditions regarding
the inflation rate are met,28 but these two rules differ in some important respects. To




The BOJ chooses overnight call rate in each period so as to achieve this target criterion
if is possible; however, if it is not possible due to the zero interest rate bound, it simply
sets the call rate at zero.
This BOJ rule differs from the regime of history dependent inflation targeting in
the following respects. First, the output gap, x, is completely ignored in the BOJ’s
targeting criterion, while it plays an important role in the targeting criterion of the
history dependent inflation targeting unless λ equals to zero. Put differently, under
the BOJ rule, fluctuations in the output gap do not affect the timing to terminate a
zero interest rate policy (or quantitative easing policy). Second, the target inflation
rate is never revised under the BOJ rule, while equation (3.3) requires the central
bank to revise the target for the next period depending on whether it successfully
shoot the target in the current period.29 In fact, despite the occurrence of a series of
unanticipated adverse events including the failures of major banks, the target inflation
rate has never been revised since the introduction of a zero interest rate policy in
February 1999: some of the BOJ board members repeatedly showed an adherence to
the commitment made in the past and no intention at all to revise its target level
of inflation.30 As seen in equation (3.3), the target inflation rate should have been
upwardly revised in response to these additional shocks to the natural rate of interest.
The lack of history dependent responses to unanticipated additional shocks implies the
suboptimality of the BOJ rule.
To make a quantitative evaluation on the difference between the two rules, we
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construct a time-series of πTart using the actual data. Specifically, we assume that the
target level for the adjusted inflation rate was zero just before the introduction of a
zero interest rate policy, and then compute πTart by substituting the actual values for
the inflation rate and the output gap into equation (3.3). The basic idea of this exercise
is as follows. If the BOJ rule is very close to the optimal one, then we should observe
that the computed target rate is always close to π̄Tar, say, two percent per year. On
the other hand, if the deviation of the BOJ rule from the optimal one is not negligible,
then the exercise of computing target inflation using (3.3) would be a wrong one, which
could yield unrealistically large numbers for the target rate of inflation.31 The result
presented in the upper panel of Figure 10 clearly shows that the computed target in
each period is significantly higher than zero, suggesting that the deviation of the BOJ
rule from the optimal one was not small.
(Insert Figure 10 here)
The lower panel of Figure 10 conducts the same exercise but now we take into
account supply shocks to make the discussion closer to the reality. If deflation since
the late 1990s is at least partly due to supply shocks (or equivalently, changes in relative
prices), the target level of inflation that the BOJ seeks to achieve should be lowered
to some extent.32 To incorporate this type of argument into our model, we divide the
items contained in the CPI into two subgroups, “goods” and “services”, and denote
the inflation rate in each sector by π̂1t and π̂2t. The inflation rate in each sector is not
necessarily identical, thus the relative price between the two sectors could change over
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time. This is the situation in which Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) discuss the optimal
monetary policy under the assumption of sticky prices. Benigno (2004) searches for a
desirable index of the inflation rate that a central bank should target, and finds that it
is not the traditional CPI inflation rate (namely, the simple average of the two inflation
rates) but
γπ̂1t + (1 − γ)π̂2t,
where the weight γ is defined by
γ ≡ nα1(1 − α1)
−1(1 − α1β)−1
nα1(1 − α1)−1(1 − α1β)−1 + (1 − n)α2(1 − α2)−1(1 − α2β)−1 .
Here αi represents the probability of no price adjustments being allowed (αi takes a
larger value for more sticky prices). Note that if the core inflation rate defined above
equals to zero, the traditional CPI inflation rate (nπ̂1t + (1−n)π̂2t, where n represents
the CPI weight for the goods sector) equates to (n − γ)[π̂1t − π̂2t].33 Given that the
central bank responds to relative price changes as recommended by Benigno (2004),
this implies that (3.3) changes to the following rule34
πTart = (n − γ) [π̂1t − π̂2t] + [1 + β−1 + κ(βσ)−1]∆πt−1 − β−1∆πt−2. (3.4)
The lower panel of Figure 10 presents the implied target inflation rate πTart computed
using equation (3.4).35 The implied target inflation rate is now much closer to zero
as compared with the upper panel, but it still requires high inflation of more than
two percent per quarter. This implies that a quantitative difference between history
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dependent inflation targeting and the BOJ rule is not trivial even if we take supply
shocks into consideration.
4 Fiscal policy in 1999–2004
4.1 Did the Japanese government follow a Ricardian rule in
1999–2004?
It is assumed in section 2 that fiscal policy is passive (or locally Ricardian) in the sense
that the government adjusts the primary surplus so that the government’s solvency
condition is satisfied for any path of the price level. In this subsection, we look at the
behavior of the Japanese government to see whether or not this assumption has been
satisfied since early 1999, when the BOJ introduced a new policy regime.
Evidences from the time-series data A positive linkage between the primary
surplus and the real value of public debt is one of the most important implications of
Ricardian fiscal policy.36 Everything else equal, a fall in the price level leads to an
increase in the real value of public debt, and then the Ricardian government responds
to it by increasing the primary surplus.
(Insert Figure 11 here)
The upper panel of Figure 11 shows the gross public debt (relative to the nominal
GDP) on the horizontal axis against the primary surplus (relative to the nominal GDP)
on the vertical axis, for 1970–2003. This Figure shows that both variables tend to de-
teriorate simultaneously in the 1990s, indicating a negative correlation between them.
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However, such a correlation may be spurious for the following reasons. First, cycli-
cal fluctuations in economic activities lead to changes in the primary surplus, mainly
through changes in tax revenues. Since we are mainly interested in the government’s
discretionary responses to various shocks, we need to remove the changes in primary
surplus due to such an automatic stabilizer. Second, as emphasized by Barro (1986)
and Bohn (1998), the government’s tax-smoothing behavior could create a negative
correlation between the two variables. For example, think about the consequence of a
temporary increase in public expenditure. It is possible to increase taxes simultane-
ously in accordance with it, but changing marginal tax rates over time increases the
excess burden of taxation. Therefore, an optimizing government minimizes the costs
of taxation by smoothing marginal tax rates over time. This implies that a temporary
increase in public expenditures would lead to a decrease in the primary surplus and an
increase in the public debt.
(Insert Table 3 here)
Following Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998), we remove these two factors by estimating
a regression of the form
SURPLUS t = a0 + a1GVARt + a2YVARt + a3DEBT t−1 + υt, (4.1)
where SURPLUS t is the primary surplus, DEBT t−1 is the amount of the public debt at
the end of the previous period, GVARt is the level of temporary government spending,
measured by the deviation of the government spending from its trend, and YVARt is
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the output gap, measured by the deviation of the GDP from its trend (all relative to
GDP).37 The columns [1] and [2] of Table 3 present the ordinary least squares estimates
of this equation for the sample period 1970–2003: the column [1] uses the gross public
debt while the column [2] uses the net public debt.38 The coefficients on GVAR and
YVAR are in the correct sign and statistically significant in both specifications, while
the coefficient of our interest, a3, is almost equal to zero in both specifications, rejecting
the Ricardian fiscal policy rule. To see why it is rejected, the lower panel of Figure 11
plots the two variables again, but now the primary surplus is adjusted by subtracting
the business cycle component as well as the temporary government spending component
(SURPLUS t − (a0 + a1GVARt + a2YVARt)). As seen in the figure, there is indeed
a positive correlation between the two variables during the period 1970–1993: the
adjusted primary surplus tends to increase by about 0.10 percentage points for one
percentage point increase in the public debt, which is close to the corresponding U.S.
figures reported in Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998). On the other hand, during the period
1994–2003, we observe a slightly negative correlation between the two variables even
after controlling for the business cycle factor and temporary government spending. The
lack of a positive relationship in the latter period may be due to low nominal interest
rates during the post-bubble period, particularly during the period of the zero interest
rate policy and quantitative easing (see equation (2.13)).
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To control for fluctuations in nominal interest rates in addition to the business cycle
and temporary government spending, we now estimate a regression of the form
SURPLUS t = b0 + b1GVARt + b2YVARt + b3INTEREST t + υt, (4.2)
where INTEREST t represents the government’s debt interest payments, which corre-
sponds to the expression on the right hand side of (2.13). Note that (4.2) can be a
good approximation to (4.1) as long as the interest rate is constant over time, but not
so during the period in which the interest rate exhibits a significant fluctuation as it
did in the latter half of the 1990s. The estimate of this equation for the same sample
period (1970–2003) is reported in the columns [3] (in which gross debt interest pay-
ments is used) and [4] (in which net debt interest payments is used). The coefficients
on GVAR and YVAR are almost the same as before, but the coefficient on the debt
interest payments is now positive and significantly greater than unity, implying that
the Ricardian rule cannot be rejected. These sets of regression results indicate that
the Japanese government adjusted the primary surplus in response to changes in the
public debt, but only through changes in the debt interest payments.39
(Insert Figure 12 here)
Given that the Japanese government behavior was, on average, consistent with
the Ricardian rule during 1970-2003, Figure 12 looks more closely at the difference
between the actual and fitted values for the primary surplus, which can be interpreted
as a measure for the deviation from the Ricardian rule.40 There are three phases
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in which the residual takes significant positive values: 1970-74, 1987-92, and 1999-
2002. It is not surprising to observe positive residuals in 1987-92, a period of famous
episode of fiscal reconstruction during which the Japanese government intensively cut
expenditures to achieve a target of “no net issuance of government bonds”.41 But
it might be somewhat surprising to observe positive residuals in 1999-2002, during
which the Japanese economy had been in the midst of deflation. This result supports
the view that the Japanese government started fiscal tightening just after the Obuchi
Administration ended in April 2000.42 It also suggests that policy coordination
between the government and the BOJ did not work well during this period, in the
sense that the government deviated from the Ricardian rule toward fiscal tightening
while the BOJ adopted a zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing.
Evidences from the private sector’s forecasts By taking innovations of the log-
linear version of equation (2.13), we obtain
(Et − Et−q)ŝt = (1 − β)−1(Et − Et−q )̂it−1
+(Et − Et−q)
{
(1 − βθ)[B̂t−1 + (βθ)−1Q̂t−1] − P̂t
}
,
which simply states that the forecast errors in the primary surplus should be positively
correlated with those in the real public debt as well as those in the nominal interest
rate. This suggests that looking at the correlation between the forecast errors for those
variables is another way to test the assumptions of Ricardian fiscal policy. Suppose that
the private sector did not expect a change in the monetary policy regime from discretion
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to commitment,43 and that, at the end of 1998, just before the introduction of a new
monetary policy regime, they expected the discretionary solution would continue to
be realized in the coming years. Given the analysis in section 2, this implies that the
private sector should be surprised not only by a change in monetary policy, but also
by a shift in fiscal policy toward more expansionary (or less tightening) in 1999 and
subsequent years, because the price level should be unexpectedly higher and thus the
real debt burden should be unexpectedly lower.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Table 4 compares the forecasts about fiscal policy variables published in December
1998 by the JCER44 with the corresponding actual values. The fiscal surplus, which is
measured by the net saving of the general government (relative to the nominal GDP),
was expected to deteriorate over time, starting from -0.085 in FY1999 to -0.117 in
FY2003. But this expectation turns out to be too pessimistic: the corresponding
actual values were -0.077 in FY1999 and -0.081 in FY2003. These forecast errors seem
to be consistent with the theoretical prediction obtained in section 2. However, what is
going on behind them is quite different from the theoretical prediction. First, the rate
of deflation was higher than expected: very mild deflation in terms of the GDP deflator
was expected (0.3 percent per year in 1998–2003), while the actual rate of deflation
turned out to be much higher (1.8 percent per year during the same period). Second,
in spite of the unexpectedly high rate of deflation, the public debt, measured by the
gross debt (relative to the nominal GDP) of the general government at the beginning
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of each fiscal year, was lower than expected. For example, the figure for FY2003 was
expected to be 1.790 but turned out to be 1.619, mainly due to a slower accumulation
of nominal government debt. Third, and most importantly, the combination of an
overprediction of the public debt (i.e., an unexpectedly low government debt) and
an underprediction of the fiscal surplus (i.e., an unexpectedly small fiscal deficit) is
inconsistent with the assumption of Ricardian fiscal policy. Together with the fact
that the nominal interest rate was lower than expected,45 this suggests the possibility
that the Japanese government deviated from the Ricardian fiscal policy rule toward
tightening.
(Insert Table 5 here)
To investigate further the unanticipated improvement in fiscal deficits, Table 5
shows how forecasts for the amount of public investment were updated over time.46
The amount of public investment tends to be decided on a discretionary basis; therefore
the government’s fiscal policy intention should be more clearly seen in its changes.
Table 5 shows that downward revisions were consistently made for the years of FY1999,
2000 and 2001, while no substantial revisions were made for FY2002 and 2003. This
suggests that an unanticipated shift in fiscal policy stance toward contraction took
place around the year 2000.
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4.2 Optimal monetary policy under the assumption of non-
Ricardian fiscal policy
The above evidence suggests that the Japanese government has been deviating from
Ricardian fiscal policy since the latter half of the 1990s. Given that evidence, the
next question we would like to address is whether the deviation from Ricardian pol-
icy has some implications for optimal monetary policy commitment. As shown by
Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) in a model with perfectly flexible prices, the optimal
commitment solution differs depending on whether the government follows a Ricardian
or a non-Ricardian policy. This is because the government solvency condition implies
an equilibrium relation between current and expected future inflation under the as-
sumption of non-Ricardian fiscal policy, so that the central bank must choose between
deflation now or deflation later, a tradeoff analogous to the “unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace (1981). It is important to note that, in this situ-
ation, Krugman’s (1998) prescription of making a commitment to a higher price level
in the future would not work well, as emphasized by Iwamura and Watanabe (2002).
To see how the optimal monetary policy commitment would change, let us conduct
the same exercise as we did in section 2.2, but now under the assumption of non-
Ricardian fiscal policy. Since the government solvency condition (equation (2.31)) is
no longer automatically satisfied, we have to consider (2.31) as an additional constraint
for the central bank’s loss minimization problem. To simplify the discussion, we assume
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that all bonds are perpetual bonds (θ = 1), then (2.31) reduces to47
∞∑
t=0










Lt + 2φ1t[x̂t − x̂t+1 + σ−1(̂it − π̂t+1 − r̂nt )]
+2φ2t[π̂t − κx̂t − βπ̂t+1] + 2µ [π̂t + (1 − β)ŝt]
}
,
where µ is a new Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s solvency con-
dition (4.3). Denoting the optimal value of Lt by L
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The difference equation that characterizes the timing to terminate a zero interest rate
policy (equation (2.29)) now becomes
φ1t − [1 + β−1 + κ(βσ)−1]φ1t−1 + β−1φ1t−2 = −κ[π̂t + κ−1λ(x̂t − x̂t−1)] − κµ,
and its unique solution is given by
φ1t = −κA(L)[π̂t + κ−1λ(x̂t − x̂t−1)] − κµA(1), (4.4)
where the definition of A(L) is the same as before, and A(1) satisfies A(1) = (1 −
ξ1)
−1(1 − ξ2)−1 < 0. Then, it is straightforward to see that if a zero interest rate
policy is terminated in the same period as in section 2 (namely, period T c), φ1t takes
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a positive value at t = T c + 1, indicating that a zero interest rate policy should be
continued longer in the case of non-Ricardian fiscal policy. Put differently, the property
of history dependence plays a more important role in the case when the government
deviates from Ricardian fiscal policy.
5 Conclusion
Have the Japanese central bank and the government adopted appropriate policies to
escape from the liquidity trap? To address this question, we first characterize optimal
policy responses to a substantial decline in the natural rate of interest, and then discuss
monetary and fiscal policy rules to implement them. Based on this analysis, we compare
the optimal policy rules with the actual policy decisions made by the Japanese central
bank and the government in 1999–2004.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the optimal commitment
solution can be implemented through history dependent inflation targeting in which
the target inflation rate is revised depending on the past performance of monetary
policy. We compare this optimal rule with the Bank of Japan’s policy commitment
of continuing monetary easing until some conditions regarding the inflation rate are
satisfied, and find that the BOJ rule lacks history dependence in the sense that the
BOJ had no intention of revising the target level of inflation in spite of the occurrence
of various additional shocks to the Japanese economy. Second, the term structure
of the interest rate gap (i.e., the spread between the actual real interest rate and
its natural rate counterpart) was not downward sloping, suggesting that the BOJ’s
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commitment failed to have a sufficient influence on the market’s expectations about
the future course of monetary policy. Third, we find time-series evidence that the
primary surplus in 1999-2002 was higher than predicted by the historical regularity.
Also, by comparing the private sector’s forecasts with the corresponding actual values,
we find a combination of an unexpectedly low government debt and an unexpectedly
small fiscal deficit. Such evidence on the government’s behavior suggests that the
Japanese government deviated from Ricardian fiscal policy toward fiscal tightening.
The optimal commitment solution obtained under the assumption of non-Ricardian
fiscal policy implies that, given such government’s behavior, the central bank should
continue a zero interest rate policy longer.
Notes
1 Rogoff (1998) casts doubt on the plausibility of this diagnosis by pointing out
that the investment-GDP ratio is well over 20 percent in Japan. Benhabib et al. (2002)
show the existence of a self-fulfilling deflationary equilibrium, in which deflation and
zero interest rates simultaneously occur even if the natural rate of interest stays above
zero. Christiano (2004) investigates the numerical conditions under which the natural
rate of interest falls temporarily below zero, using a model with endogenous capital
formation.
2 Note that this argument assumes that an adverse shock to the natural rate of
interest is not permanent but temporary. Otherwise, future overnight rates are also
constrained by the zero lower bound, so that there is no room for lowering the long-
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term nominal interest rate. Svensson (2001) names this a temporary liquidity trap to
emphasize the difference from the original definition by Keynes (1936) in which the
long-term nominal interest rate faces the zero bound constraint.
3 For example, Governor Toshihiko Fukui stated on June 1, 2003 that the idea
behind the current policy commitment is “to achieve an easing effect by the Bank’s
commitment to keep short-term rates at low levels well into the future. In this way,
even if short-term rates come up against the lower bound, the Bank can still “borrow”
from the effect of the future low rates” (Fukui (2003)).
4 The BOJ terminated this commitment in August 2000, and made a new com-
mitment of maintaining quantitative easing policy until “the core CPI registers stably a
zero percent or an increase year on year” in March 2001. See Table 1 for the chronology
of the BOJ’s monetary policy decisions in 1999–2004.
5 With respect to this, Krugman (2000) states, “We assume ... that any implica-
tions of the [open market] operation for the government’s budget constraint are taken
care of via lump-sum taxes and transfers” (Krugman (2000), p. 225).
6 Under the assumption of complete financial markets, the existence and unique-
ness of such an asset-pricing kernel follows from the absence of arbitrage opportunities.
7 Here we implicitly assume that the second type of household faces a flow budget
constraint similar to (2.1), and that they exhaust their budget constraint.
8 The definition of ît differs slightly from those of the other variables; namely,
ît ≡ ln(1 + it) − ln(1 + i∗t ).
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9 The household’s intertemporal budget constraint and the market clearing con-
dition imply that B∗t−1,t/P
∗
t = (1− βθ)(1− β)−1s∗t holds on the baseline path. We use
this to obtain (2.9).
10 See Woodford (2003) for more on the derivation.
11 Here we assume that the short-term nominal interest rate might be zero in the
present and subsequent periods, but that it is strictly above zero in the sufficiently
remote future, so that limτ→∞ Et[Qt,τ+1] = 0.
12 Note that equation (2.5), which is an equilibrium condition related to govern-
ment solvency, is not a part of the key equations, since it is automatically satisfied as
long as the government follows the rule (2.12).
13 Since Q̂t = −ît −
∑∞
j=1(βθ)
jEt [̂it+1 + ît+2 + · · · + ît+j−1], the value of Q̂t is
determined by the path of the short-term nominal interest rate chosen by the central
bank. Note that the expectations theory holds locally (i.e., as long as deviations of
each variable from its baseline value are small enough).
14 Here we assume that, following Jung et al. (2003), the shock to the natural
rate of interest is known in period 0 and that no new information arrives in the subse-
quent periods. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b) extend the analysis by introducing
stochastic disturbances of some special form. It is important to note that certainty
equivalence does not hold in our optimization problem because of the non-negativity
constraint on nominal interest rates, so that the difference between a deterministic and
a stochastic environment is not trivial.
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15 Note that, given the assumption that the economy is on the baseline before
the natural rate of interest falls in period 0, B̂−1 in equation (2.31) must be zero.
16 For example, in the case of θ = 0, in which all bonds are one-period bonds,
reductions in the short-term nominal interest rate in the current and future periods
have no influence on the current bond price, so that the first term in the squared bracket
((1 − βθ)∑∞t=0(βθ)tE0(Q̂0,t)) is zero, and the expression in the squared bracket takes
a large negative value. On the other hand, if all bonds are perpetual bonds (θ = 1),
the expression in the squared bracket equals to zero.
17 See Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) for a similar argument in a setting of per-
fectly flexible prices.
18 The values for structural parameters are borrowed from Woodford (1999): λ =
0.048/42; β = 0.99; σ = 0.157; κ = 0.024. We assume that θ = 0.8. The initial shock
to the natural rate of interest, εn0 in equation (2.16), is equal to -0.10, which means a
40 percent decline in the annualized natural rate of interest. The persistence of the
shock, which is represented by ρ in equation (2.16), is 0.5 per quarter. The parameter
values are all adjusted so that the length of a period in our model is interpreted as a
quarter.
19 Put differently, this implies that keeping the maturity of government debt
longer during peacetime (i.e., on the baseline) is an effective way of insuring against
the risk of falling into a liquidity trap. See Iwamura and Watanabe (2002) for more on
this point.
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20 Admittedly, this simple relationship between the interest rate gap and x̂t or
π̂t depends on the structure of our model. However, Neiss and Nelson (2003) find a
similar relationship, through simulation analysis, in a more complicated (and realistic)
model with endogenous capital formation, habit persistence in consumption, and price
setting of the Fuhrer-Moore type. Also, their empirical analysis using the UK data
finds a reasonably strong negative relationship between the interest rate gap and the
inflation rate.
21 Laubach and Williams (2003) use the Kalman filter method to estimate a sys-
tem of equations consisting of the observation equations (i.e., the IS and AS equations)
and the transition equations that describe the law of motion for the components of the
natural rate of interest. The same methodology is applied to the Japanese data by
Oda and Muranaga (2003). We would like to thank Thomas Laubach and John C.
Williams for providing us with the program code used in their paper.
22 Specifically, zt follows a AR (1) process, which is estimated as zt = 0.8304 ∗
zt−1 + et.
23 The JCER Mid-term Economic Forecasts, various issues.
24 The definition of the term structure of interest rate gaps is given in (3.1). Note
that gaps are not annualized.
25 See Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) for the evolution of the term structure of
nominal interest rates during the zero interest rate period.
26 The only example of a downward sloping curve we observe in Figure 8 is the
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year 2002 (December 2002), in which the expected one-year real interest rate in each
year was close to zero, but the corresponding natural rate was well above two percent,
so that the interest rate gap declines by about two percent per year. This might be
due to imprecise estimates of the natural rate of interest towards the end of the sample
period.
27 Price-level targeting to implement the commitment solution can be derived in
a similar way. We define an output-gap adjusted price-level index as P̃t ≡ P̂t +κ−1λx̂t,
and denote the target shortfall as ∆Pt ≡ P Tart − P̃t. Then, substituting φ1t = κ∆Pt into
(2.29) leads to an equation describing the evolution of the target price level (equation
(3.11) in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003b)). See the middle panel of Figure 9 for
the path of P Tart to implement the commitment solution. By a similar calculation,
we can characterize an instrument rule to implement the commitment solution: ît =
max{0 − i∗t , iTart }, where iTart = r̂nt + [1 + βκσ(κ2 + λ)−1]Etπ̂t+1 + σEtx̂t+1 − λσ(κ2 +
λ)−1x̂t−1 + [1+β−1 +κ(βσ)−1]∆it−1 −β−1∆it−2, and ∆it ≡ iTart − ît. See the lower panel
of Figure 9 for the path of iTart that implements the commitment solution.
28 For example, Governor Fukui emphasizes the importance of intentional policy
delay by stating that the BOJ will continue to implement monetary easing “even after
the economy has started to improve and inflationary expectations are emerging” (Fukui
(2003)).
29 Most of the discussions about the BOJ’s policy commitments have focused on
whether π̄Tar is high enough to escape from the liquidity trap. However, somewhat
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surprisingly, little has been said about the absence of state-contingent responses to
additional shocks.
30 However, this does not necessarily mean that the BOJ did not make any re-
sponse to additional shocks. On the contrary, it responded to them by revising the
target for the current account balances very frequently: it has been revised nine times
during the last three years. However, as correctly pointed out by Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003a), an additional provision of liquidity to the market without any im-
plications about the future course of monetary policy has no effects on the economy as
long as the demand for liquidity reaches a satiation level (“Irrelevance proposition”).
31 For example, if one substitutes the values of π and x obtained in the discre-
tionary solution (rather than those obtained in the commitment solution) into (3.3),
then one would obtain extremely large numbers for the target rate of inflation.
32 With respect to an appropriate policy response to supply shocks, a BOJ policy
board member stated, “It would be difficult for monetary policy to control the impact
of supply shocks. If monetary policy were to try to control such impacts, it is likely
that sustainable price stability would be impaired as production swings became larger
and uncertainty regarding investment increased. Therefore, we should accept change
in prices due to supply shocks to a certain extent” (Shinotsuka (2000)).
33 As pointed out by Benigno (2004), the traditional CPI inflation rate coincides
with the core inflation rate if α1 = α2 or either of the two is equal to zero.
34 It should be noted that this rule is not derived by solving an optimization
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problem. However, Kudo et al. (2005) explicitly solves a central bank’s loss minimiza-
tion problem in a two-sector economy with asymmetric sectoral shocks, and obtains
an optimal monetary policy rule that is very close to (3.4) in the case when prices are
perfectly flexible in one of the two sectors.
35 The values for α1 and α2 are taken from the estimates in Fuchi and Watanabe
(2002): α1 = 0.389 and α2 = 0.853. Other parameter values are the same as before.
36 Woodford (1998) emphasizes that a positive linkage between these two variables
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the Ricardian rule to hold, because a
similar positive linkage could emerge even under the non-Ricardian fiscal policy rules,
through a response of the price level to a change in the expected future primary surplus.
37 GVARt and YVARt are defined by GVARt ≡ (Gt − G∗t )/Yt and YVARt ≡
(1−Yt/Y ∗t )(G∗t/Yt), where Gt is the real government spending, Yt is the real GDP, and
G∗t and Y
∗
t represent the trend of each variable estimated by the HP filter. See Barro
(1986) for more on the definition of these two variables.
38 The difference between the gross and net figures is not trivial in Japan: for
example, the debt-GDP ratio in 2003 is 1.6 for the gross debt, while 0.7 for the net
debt. Broda and Weinstein (2004) argue that the net figure should be used to evaluate
the Japanese fiscal situation.
39 It should be noted that these results do not necessarily imply that the Japanese
fiscal situation is not so bad. First, according to our definition of Ricardian rule
(equation (2.12)), a government is required to generate primary surplus only to cover
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debt interest payments in each period: it is not required to immediately repay the
principal of debts. Given that interest rates are very close to zero, this requirement
is not so difficult to fulfill even for a government with huge amount of public debts.
Second, our Ricardian government is allowed to ignore “off-balance” debts, such as
public pension expenditures that are expected to rise sharply in the near future. That
is, a government is allowed to postpone fiscal reconstruction until off-balance items
actually change to on-balance items. Our empirical results shown in Table 3 indicate
that the Japanese government has a nice track record in the sense that it has not
violated the Ricardian criterion at least so far; however, we do not have much to say
about what will happen when the central bank turns to monetary tightening, or when
public pension expenditures actually start to rise sometime in the future.
40 Here we use the estimates in the column [3] of Table 3; but we obtain the same
result even when we use the specification [4] of Table 3.
41 See Ihori et al. (2001) for more on the fiscal reform during this period.
42 See, for example, Iio (2004). According to Iio (2004), the shift in fiscal pol-
icy stance toward tightening occurred during the Mori Administration (April 2000 to
April 2001) and the Koizumi Administration (April 2001 to the present). Iio (2004)
argues that a change in the electoral system from the middle-size district system to the
single-member district & PR party lists parallel system has strengthened the influence
of the prime minister relative to other political players, thereby creating a political
environment for these administrations to start fiscal reconstruction. See, for example,
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Persson and Tabellini (2000) for more on the relationship between electoral systems
and fiscal policy making.
43 The BOJ had been conducting monetary policy in a discretionary manner
before it started a zero interest rate policy (See, for example, Ueda (1993)). Also, Ueda
(2000) emphasized the importance of the regime switch from discretion to commitment
by stating that “the ZIRP [zero interest rate policy] was a unique experiment in the
history of the BOJ not just because the level of the overnight rate was zero but because
it involved some commitment about the future course of monetary policy”.
44 The JCER Mid-term Economic Forecast, December 1998.
45 According to the JCER forecast in December 1998, the government bonds yield
(10 years, benchmark) was expected to be 1.40, 1.72 and 1.94 percent in 2001, 2002,
and 2003, much higher than the actual values.
46 The Nomura Research Institute, The NRI Short-term Forecast, various issues.
47 We continue to assume as before that the economy is on the baseline before
period 0, so that B−1 = 0.




sponse to a substantial decline in the natural rate of interest. The multiplier µ can be
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Table 1: Chronology of Monetary Policy Decisions in 1999–2004
Dates Events
09/09/98 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.25 from 0.50 percent
02/12/99 The BOJ introduces a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP)
04/13/99 Governor Hayami announces the BOJ will continue the ZIRP
until “deflationary concerns are dispelled”
10/13/99 The BOJ expands the range of money market operations
08/11/00 The BOJ terminates the ZIRP.
The target O/N rate is set at 0.25 percent
02/09/01 The BOJ introduces “Lombard-type” lending facility
and reduces the official discount rate to 0.375 from 0.5 percent
02/28/01 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.125 percent
and the official discount rate to 0.25 percent
03/19/01 The BOJ announces to introduce “quantitative monetary easing policy”
and continue it until “the core CPI records a year-on-year increase of
zero percent or more on a stable basis.”
The target current account balance (CAB) is set at 5 trillion yen
08/14/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 6 trillion yen
09/18/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to above 6 trillion yen
12/19/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 10–15 trillion yen
10/30/02 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 15–20 trillion yen
04/01/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 17–22 trillion yen
04/30/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 22–27 trillion yen
05/20/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27–30 trillion yen
10/10/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27–32 trillion yen.
The BOJ announces more detailed description of its commitment
regarding the timing to terminate “quantitative easing policy”
01/20/04 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 30–35 trillion yen
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Table 2: Fiscal Adjustments in the Discretionary and Commitment Solutions




Commitment solution (A) -7.174 -6.569 -3.937 0.001
Discretionary solution (B) -5.345 -4.749 -2.581 0.035




Commitment solution (C) -11.009 -10.404 -7.771 -3.832
Discretionary solution (D) -0.465 0.132 2.300 4.916
(C)-(D) -10.544 -10.535 -10.071 -8.748
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Table 3: Estimates of Fiscal Policy Rules
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant -0.021 -0.012 -0.079 -0.052
(0.021) (0.016) (0.008) (0.005)
GVAR -1.904 -1.810 -1.640 -1.546
(0.842) (0.818) (0.311) (0.410)
YVAR -1.549 -1.256 -2.334 -2.453
(0.719) (0.649) (0.205) (0.220)
Gross public debt 0.017
(0.029)
Net public debt 0.012
(0.062)
Gross debt interest payments 2.279
(0.260)
Net debt interest payments 3.559
(0.454)
R2 0.330 0.322 0.815 0.746
σ 0.022 0.023 0.012 0.014
DW 0.237 0.243 0.515 0.363
Note: Dependent variable is the primary surplus (relative to
GDP).
Figures in parenthesis represent standard errors.
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Table 4: Private Sector’s Forecast about Fiscal Policy
Forecast Actual
Net saving of the general government






Gross debt of the general government at the beginning of each year













Note: Forecast was published in December 1998 by the Japan Center
for Economic Research (JCER).
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Table 5: Private Sector’s Forecast about Public Investment
The amount of public investment in





1999.12 106.3 110.4 110.4
2000.03 104.6 104.6 104.4
2000.06 100.8 99.4 98.6
2000.09 100.2 99.5
2000.12 94.2 90.8 83.7
2001.03 96.8 95.0 87.3
2001.06 92.9 90.1 81.7
2001.09 88.9 83.0
2001.12 87.3 86.6 81.8
2002.03 87.9 87.5 83.3








Note: Figures represent forecasts made by the Nomura
Research Institute. Index, FY1997=100.
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Figure 3: Optimal Responses under Discretion
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Figure 4: Optimal Responses under Commitment
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Figure 5: Differences between the Commitment and Discretionary Solutions
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Figure 6: Estimates of the Natural Rate of Interest 
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Figure 9: Monetary Policy Rules to Implement the Commitment Solution
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Figure 12: Deviations from the Ricardian Fiscal Policy Rule 
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